

The Cuban Missile Crisis: Looking Down the Gun Barrel

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Research Paper

The Cuban Missile Crisis is one of the most documented events in history, so why has history gotten it so wrong? Titles like *Maximum Danger* and *On the Brink of Doom* represent common attitudes toward the crisis but do not reflect the true essence. The Cuban Missile Crisis was not just a conflict about missiles; it was a conflict of philosophies, egos, and confidence.¹ Nikita Khrushchev and John Kennedy came together and compromised. They understood that “after a nuclear war the winner would not look very different from the loser.”²

Khrushchev and Kennedy were polar opposites. (See Appendix 1) One was a staunch Communist and the other a devoted Capitalist. However, both men were governed by the politics of public opinion. Each had experienced the devastation of war first-hand serving in WWII. Both were stubborn, powerful defenders of their beliefs but ultimately advocated compromise and "peaceful coexistence." Fidel Castro was the charismatic leader of a proud people who risked everything for the cause of Socialism, but he had little control over his own fate.³

The Cuban Missile Crisis was one conflict in the larger cold war between Communism and Democracy.⁴ The overthrow of the Batista government in Cuba brought Fidel Castro to power. Castro's rejection of US economic and political control in Cuba quickly caused relations with America to disintegrate.⁵ Castro, influenced by his brother Raul and fellow revolutionary Che Guevara, appealed to Khrushchev for support. Khrushchev was delighted to have a new

¹ Sergei Khrushchev, Telephone Interview, 8 January 2008.

² Sergei N Khrushchev. *Nikita Khrushchev: and the Creation of a Superpower*. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press, 2000.

³ James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn and David A. Welch. *Cuba On the Brink: Castro, The Missile Crisis, and The Soviet Collapse*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1993.

⁴ Don Munton, and David A. Welch, *The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

⁵ It was the Eisenhower administration that implemented America's policies towards Cuba after the Cuban revolution. Castro refused to allow the US to dominate Cuba's economic and political affairs. This policy built a chasm between Cuba and America. Kennedy intensified the political chasm by denouncing Castro in several speeches during the 1960 Presidential election.

ally so close to America saying, Castro was no Communist, but America made him one.⁶ (See Appendix 2) Tensions with Cuba further intensified after the US backed Bay of Pigs invasion failed to overthrow Castro.⁷ During the Bay of Pigs invasion Kennedy had failed to act and appeared indecisive to Khrushchev. After the Bay of Pigs, Khrushchev learned another invasion was being planned and knew John Kennedy wouldn't fail to act again.⁸

The Cold War was a fierce competition between the superpowers and their allies.⁹ One of the most intense conflicts was nuclear arms development. The world's perception that Soviet and American nuclear forces were equal was a deterrent that kept the cold war stable but was in fact false. The West had built a 17-1 nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union tipping the balance of power.¹⁰ Khrushchev's nuclear disadvantage was a problem he had to solve. Khrushchev decided on a solution. He would send nuclear missiles to Cuba, reasoning that Castro would be protected and nuclear balance restored. Khrushchev acted with utmost secrecy. Soldiers were disguised as civilians, loading was completed at night, and ships took roundabout routes to Cuba.¹¹ (See Appendix 3)

On October 14, 1962, Khrushchev's plan was discovered a month earlier than intended when Major Richard Kaiser flew his U-2 spy plane over Cuba and photographed suspicious sites

⁶ Michael R. Beschloss. *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev 1960 – 1963*. New York: Edward Burlingame Books, 1991.

⁷ On April 17, 1961, Cuban exiles trained by the CIA invaded Cuba in an attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro. Castro was aware the attack was coming and repelled the invaders. At the crucial moment President Kennedy failed to support the invasion in order to cover up US involvement. Kennedy was indecisive and appeared weak. The invasion strengthened Castro and emboldened Khrushchev to place missiles in Cuba.

⁸ Khrushchev 482.

⁹ The cold war was also a clash of ideologies, espionage, psychology, and technological developments. There was never an active military confrontation but several crises threatened to escalate into world wars.

¹⁰ Robert Weisbrot. *Maximum Danger: Kennedy, the Missiles, and the Crisis of American Confidence*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, Publisher, 2001.

¹¹ Khrushchev 509.

near Havana. (See Appendix 4) President Kennedy was furious. The Soviets had assured him they “would never become involved” in building offensive military capacity in Cuba.¹² For six days President Kennedy kept it secret that Khrushchev’s plan had been discovered.¹³ During this time, he formed ExComm, which consisted of a select group of 12 advisors to help him formulate a response to Khrushchev.¹⁴ (See Appendix 5) Kennedy used ExComm as a source for ideas and justification of his decisions during the crisis.¹⁵

After sleepless nights and hours of debate within ExComm, Kennedy decided a naval quarantine (blockade) of ships carrying offensive cargo from the Soviet Union to Cuba was the appropriate response to Khrushchev’s challenge. Quarantine was chosen over air strikes because it gave Khrushchev a way out if he chose it.¹⁶

On October 22, 1962, John Kennedy went on national television and gave a resolute 16-minute speech announcing to the world Khrushchev’s deception and America’s response. Kennedy’s speech was potent because it clearly communicated his desire for both peace and freedom while emphasizing his determination to resist Soviet aggression.¹⁷ By being so forceful in his speech Kennedy appeared strong, but he limited his options for a public resolution to the crisis. This forced Kennedy to strike a secret compromise or risk losing public credibility. By the time Kennedy was finished, the world was looking down the gun barrel of Nuclear War.

Khrushchev was defiant, ordering work on the missiles to continue, saying he had a right

¹² Anthony Lewis. “President Grave.” *The New York Times* 23 October 1962: 1+.

¹³ Kennedy felt this six-day period was a great advantage during the crisis. Never before in American history had a president had the luxury of time to thoroughly analyze and develop a response to a threat on America.

¹⁴ ExComm stands for Executive Committee of the National Security Council.

¹⁵ Munton and Welch 49.

¹⁶ This was a policy Kennedy followed throughout his presidency. He purposely tried to view the situation through his opponent’s eyes and help his opponent save face.

¹⁷ Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh (Editors). *The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader*. New York: The New Press, 1992.

to base missiles in Cuba like the US had done in Turkey.¹⁸ Both militaries were mobilized, and tensions between the two sides intensified as Soviet ships were nearing the quarantine line.¹⁹ At the crucial moment, Khrushchev ordered his ships carrying weapons to stop and not challenge the blockade in order to diffuse the situation. (See Appendix 6)

At this time, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a letter offering a compromise. He would remove the missiles from Cuba if America promised not to invade Cuba and end its blockade.²⁰ Before Kennedy could respond, a second letter arrived, adding that the US must also remove their nuclear missiles based in Turkey.²¹ Kennedy decided to gamble and ignore Khrushchev's second letter while accepting the better terms received in the first letter.²²

On the morning of Saturday, October 27, Kennedy sent a formal letter to Khrushchev accepting the terms offered in his first letter.²³ The most critical moment of the Crisis was that evening when Robert Kennedy, brother of the President, met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to secretly negotiate an end to the crisis.²⁴ Robert Kennedy insisted there could be no explicit deal, quid pro quo involving the missiles in Turkey. He added that the President had wanted the missiles removed for some time and could assure their removal within four to five

¹⁸ Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali. *One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, And Kennedy 1958 – 1964*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1997.

¹⁹ The US had set the quarantine line at 800 miles from Cuba but then adjusted the line to 500 miles in order to give Khrushchev more time to respond to American demands.

²⁰ Fursenko and Naftali 263.

²¹ Fursenko and Naftali 278.

²² Kennedy and ExComm were very confused by the two letters. The first letter seemed to be written by a man under great stress. The second letter had a more confrontational tone to it and seemed to have been written by someone other than Khrushchev. Kennedy and ExComm worried that Khrushchev had been removed from power.

²³ Jim Hershberg. "Anatomy of a Controversy: Anatoly F. Dobrynin's Meeting with Robert F Kennedy, Saturday, 27 October 1962." *The Cold War International History Project Bulletin* Spring 1995 Issue 5.

²⁴ Robert Kennedy was the Attorney General of The United States at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. During the crisis he acted as a personal representative for the president. When Robert Kennedy spoke everyone knew whom he represented.

months, insisting it must remain a secret understanding.²⁵ Kennedy further stressed that the Soviet Union had to commit to removing their missiles by the next day or military action might be unavoidable.²⁶

The next day, after 13 days of enormous tension with the world on the verge of nuclear war, Khrushchev capitulated and began removing his missiles from Cuba. (See Appendix 7) Fidel Castro was furious and tried to halt the missiles' removal, declaring he had been betrayed. When word reached the White House, jubilation erupted. Secretary of State Dean Rusk said, "We were eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow blinked."²⁷ (See Appendix 8) In reality, both men blinked. Khrushchev's son, Sergei, said:

My father said he did not want war because it would be the end of civilization. President Kennedy said that he didn't want to start a war for the same reasons. My father said that after the first shot they would lose control of the events and then it will become a real war. We were very close to war. Both leaders' most important legacy is that they prevented this war.²⁸

In reality, Kennedy and Khrushchev got lucky.²⁹ Before the compromise several independent events out of their control occurred that could have triggered this conflict into an unwanted war. An American U2 Spy plane was shot down over Cuba; another U 2 strayed into Soviet airspace giving the appearance of a US invasion.³⁰ (See Appendix 9) Several false nuclear

²⁵ Munton and Welch 80.

²⁶ Munton and Welch 79.

²⁷ Dino A. Brugioni. *Eyeball To Eyeball: The Inside Story Of The Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: Random House, 1990.

²⁸ Sergei Khrushchev interview. During the research for my paper I was able to interview Nikita Khrushchev's son Sergei. I approached him by email and was told he would speak with me but only after I had read his newest book, *Nikita Khrushchev: and the Creation of a Superpower*. The book has 750 pages and was a challenge to complete. Two weeks later I called him and we spent 30 minutes talking about the Cuban Missile Crisis and his father. He patiently answered all my questions and thanked me for calling him. This was a world-class opportunity I will never forget.

²⁹ *The Fog of War*. Dir. Errol Morris, Sony Picture Classics, 2003.

³⁰ Major Rudolf Anderson Jr., who piloted the U2 that was shot down over Cuba, was the only casualty of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

alerts were issued setting off alarms. US destroyers dropped depth charges on a Soviet submarine, damaging it.³¹ Fidel Castro, fearing an imminent US invasion, demanded Khrushchev launch a preemptive strike against US forces.³² These events compelled Kennedy and Khrushchev to seek a compromise or risk losing control of the crisis.

Castro, Kennedy, and Khrushchev all share the blame for a crisis that never should have happened. They let their egos and politics affect their judgment. Kennedy hated Castro for rejecting the US and spreading revolution throughout the Americas.³³ Castro taunted Kennedy with welcoming Communism to the Western Hemisphere. Khrushchev gambled and lost. He felt he was protecting a small, weak nation against a bully.³⁴ Khrushchev underestimated Kennedy. During the failed Bay of Pigs invasion and the Berlin crisis, Kennedy had been indecisive. This encouraged Khrushchev to be more aggressive in defending Cuba.³⁵ He gambled that Kennedy would do little to resist missiles in Cuba.

Khrushchev deeply resented the perceived double standard that caused his protection of Cuba to be criticized while the US placed missiles on Russia's border in Turkey. (See Appendix 10) Publicly, Khrushchev boasted the Soviet Union was the mightiest nation in the world.³⁶ Privately, he was tormented about the growing nuclear gap between the Soviet and American forces. Khrushchev had been deeply humiliated and politically damaged when Kennedy had

³¹ American officials did not learn until many years later that the Soviet submarine was armed with a nuclear missile. The submarine commander had authority to fire his weapons if he ever lost communications with Moscow for an extended time and was attacked. This incident had the greatest potential for triggering a war during the crisis.

³² Weisbrot 205.

³³ Beschloss 101.

³⁴ Fursenko 335.

³⁵ Beschloss 148.

³⁶ Beschloss 351.

made the nuclear gap public during the Berlin Crisis the year before.³⁷ By placing missiles 90 miles from American shores, Khrushchev quickly and strategically leveled the nuclear playing field and inhibited Kennedy's ability to launch a first strike or react to a Soviet attack.³⁸ (See Appendix 11) Privately, Khrushchev reveled in the idea that his missiles would make the "arrogant" Americans sweat.

The Cuban missile crisis was an American psychological crisis. It was a crisis of a people, used to being secured by two oceans, now feeling vulnerable.³⁹ For the Soviet and European peoples, it was life as usual. They had experienced WWII and the Berlin Crisis and were accustomed to having nuclear missiles on their doorstep.

The atmosphere in America during the crisis was very similar to 9/11. For many it was doomsday and Khrushchev was a monster.⁴⁰ (See Appendix 12) Talk of the crisis was unavoidable. There was panic buying in the stores. Pope John XXIII called for negotiations to spare the world the horrors of war.⁴¹ Churches were full with people seeking comfort.⁴² Mental health experts advised parents not to hide the crisis from their children.⁴³ There were protests in the street for and against war. The stock market acted with uncertainty.⁴⁴ Karen Estep, who experienced the crisis as a young girl of 11, remembers carrying around a feeling of impending doom. "I had nightmares of a ball of fire hitting the woods by my house. I guess at some point

³⁷ The gap was revealed in a speech authorized by Kennedy and given by Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric.

³⁸ Beschloss 351.

³⁹ Sergei Khrushchev interview.

⁴⁰ Karen Estep interview.

⁴¹ Arnaldo Cortesi. "Pope Bids Rulers Save the Peace." *The New York Times* 26 October 1962: 1+.

⁴² Peter Gilmour. "Spiritual Shifts." *U.S. Catholic* January 2002 Vol. 67 Issue 1: p6+.

⁴³ Beschloss 487.

⁴⁴ Clydett Farnsworth. "A Mood of Crisis Shakes Wall St." *The New York Times* 23 October 1962: 64+.

the crisis was over but they forgot to tell me. I worried about a nuclear bomb exploding for years, I think, I still do.”⁴⁵

Sergei Khrushchev said:

In this case the free press had a negative impact on Western society. They added fuel to the flames of panic by repeatedly claiming the end of the world. Every day there was more and more panic. The Soviet press was censored. The information they presented to the Soviet people was more balanced and not threatening.⁴⁶

The Soviet people were told what they needed to know and nothing more. They knew the Soviet Union had committed to protect Cuba. They knew that the Americans were threatening Cuba and had imposed a blockade. They weren’t told that Soviet missiles were in Cuba.⁴⁷

On the night of October 27, 1962, Kennedy was determined to end the crisis. The pressure to attack was becoming intense. Robert Kennedy was specifically instructed before meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin to offer the Turkey-Cuba missile deal but insist it be secret.⁴⁸ (See Appendix 13) Kennedy knew that if the compromise became public it would appear to be a concession to blackmail and damage his credibility with his allies and the American people.⁴⁹ It was so important to Kennedy that the deal remain secret, that Fidel Castro was not told of the negotiations.⁵⁰ Kennedy worried that Khrushchev might reveal the secret deal to save face. He warned US officials against publicly gloating over the missiles’ removal, saying, “Khrushchev has eaten enough crow, let’s not rub it in.”⁵¹

For years historians have debated whether there was an explicit deal that ended the crisis. As late as 1983 ExComm members had claimed the deal was only a “private assurance” not a

⁴⁵ Karen Estep interview.

⁴⁶ Sergei Khrushchev interview.

⁴⁷ Sergei Khrushchev interview.

⁴⁸ James A. Nathan, (Editor) and Barton J. Bernstein. *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited*. New York: St. Martins Press, 1992.

⁴⁹ Hershberg 1.

⁵⁰ Beschloss 595.

⁵¹ Beschloss 542.

firm deal.⁵² In 1988 ExComm member McGeorge Bundy revealed that the compromise was explicit and had been agreed to by President Kennedy before the secret meeting with Dobrynin.⁵³ After Bundy's revelation, other ExComm members confirmed they had intentionally deceived the world about the nature of the compromise that ended the Cuban Missile Crisis.⁵⁴

What would have happened if Khrushchev had insisted the deal be revealed? Kennedy would have increased the pressure on Khrushchev, then quietly encourage the United Nations to propose the same Turkey-Cuba missile trade, publicly accept the compromise, and save face.⁵⁵

It is natural in an event like the Cuban Missile Crisis to want to declare winners and losers. President Kennedy has been both praised and blamed for his part in the Crisis. Many say it was his greatest triumph.⁵⁶ Kennedy clearly won the battle of public opinion by insisting on a private deal. Although Kennedy has largely escaped criticism for his part in causing the crisis, he isn't without fault. Kennedy's anti-Castro politics and support for covert action against Cuba unnecessarily aggravated Castro, causing a crisis that didn't need to happen.⁵⁷ Kennedy provoked Khrushchev by flaunting America's nuclear superiority and stationing NATO missiles in Europe.⁵⁸ Without these provocations, Khrushchev would never have been compelled to take such a huge risk and put missiles in Cuba.

Although Khrushchev was loudly condemned for giving in to Kennedy, he never felt he had lost. He had accomplished what he set out to do. When asked if his father had lost with his gamble in Cuba, Khrushchev's son Sergei said:

He wanted to protect Cuba and he protected Cuba. It was about the United States

⁵² Nathan and Bernstein 95.

⁵³ Nathan and Bernstein 96.

⁵⁴ Nathan and Bernstein 96.

⁵⁵ Beschloss 538.

⁵⁶ Nathan and Bernstein 56.

⁵⁷ Beschloss 364.

⁵⁸ Beschloss 364.

recognizing the Soviet Union as equal. Both leaders understood that most important was their responsibility to the world. My father compromised on the terms that satisfied him. It was the same for President Kennedy. There is no winner if you are bargaining. Today there is no Khrushchev, there is no Kennedy, there is no Soviet Union, but we still see Castro on the TV.⁵⁹

For many years the story of Fidel Castro and the Cuban people was largely excluded from the popular history of the crisis.⁶⁰ Castro was furious at having been manipulated by Khrushchev. He kicked the wall and shattered a mirror denouncing Khrushchev as a “son of a bitch . . . a bastard . . . an asshole.”⁶¹ Castro was once asked, what would have happened if the US had invaded Cuba? He replied, “We would have used nuclear weapons and we would have been destroyed.”⁶² In Cuba there was no fear.⁶³ The Cuban people endured the crisis with resolve and a sense of inevitability. Many Cubans dug trenches by day and partied at night.⁶⁴ They believed a massive invasion was coming. There was sadness at the loss of families, but this was their moment of truth; they knew they were going to die.⁶⁵

The Cuban Missile Crisis was both a triumph and failure of statesmanship during one of the most dangerous times in history. John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev came together and compromised, restoring the nuclear status quo. Their compromise prevented nuclear war but prolonged the cold war for another generation. It took future leaders refusing to compromise to finally end the cold war. Fidel Castro defied the odds and survived, remaining in power for another 46 years. With all that could have happened, perhaps the real winner in October 1962 was humankind.

⁵⁹ Sergei Khrushchev interview.

⁶⁰ Blight, Allyn and Welch 248.

⁶¹ Beschloss 543.

⁶² Blight, Allyn, and Welch 249.

⁶³ Blight, Allyn, and Welch 248.

⁶⁴ Blight, Allyn, and Welch 248.

⁶⁵ Blight, Allyn, and Welch 249.

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Chang, Laurence and Peter Kornbluh (Editors), *The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader*. New York: The New Press, 1992. This Book was a valuable collection of most of the important documents and letters from the Cuban Missile Crisis. This contained all of the newest information available on the crisis. I used this a lot as a reference.

Cortesi, Arnaldo. "Pope Bids Rulers Save the Peace." *The New York Times* 26 October 1962: 1+. This article had a quote from Pope John XXIII that I used in the section about the public reaction in America.

"Duck and Cover." [Photograph] 1962. The Associated Press. This is a picture of American children doing nuclear drills. I used this picture in my appendix.

Estep, Karen. E-Mail interview. January 13, 2008. Ms. Estep was an eleven-year-old girl who lived through the crisis. She told me about the fear, and her dreams about nuclear destruction.

“ExComm Meeting.” [Photograph] October 1962. The National Security Archives.

This is a picture of ExComm during one of their meetings. I used this picture in my Appendix.

Farnsworth, Clydett. “A Mood of Crisis Shakes Wall St.” *The New York Times* 23 October 1962:

64+. This article is about the stock market during the crisis and how it dropped. I used some information from it in my paper.

“Fidel Castro and Nikita Khrushchev.” [Photograph] 1960 – 1963. The Associated Press.

Fidel Castro and Nikita hugging. This picture showed how friendly Khrushchev and Castro were. I used this picture in my Appendix.

“Jupiter Missile in Turkey.” [Photograph] 1960 – 1962. Google Images. This is a picture of a missile based in Turkey. It was these missiles that were traded for the missiles in Cuba. I used this picture in my Appendix.

“The Kennedy Brothers.” [Photograph] Date Unknown. The University of California, Los Angeles. Library. Department of Special Collections. John F Kennedy and his brother Robert. I used this picture in my appendix.

Khrushchev, Sergei N. Telephone Interview. January 8th 2008. Sergei Khrushchev is the son of Nikita Khrushchev. He answered questions about his father and the events of the crisis after I had read his book. He was also a valuable source for the Russian public reaction to the crisis. I used some good quotes from this interview.

Lewis, Anthony. “President Grave.” *The New York Times* 23 October 1962: 1+. This article talked about Kennedy’s reaction, and how he felt betrayed that there were Soviet missiles in Cuba when Soviets had said this would not happen.

“Missile Parade. Soviet Medium-Range Ballistic Missile.” [Photograph] 1961 – 1962. The

National Security Archive. This is a picture of the type of missile based in Cuba. These missiles could hit any major US city except Seattle.

Mydans, Carl. "U.S. Navy Destroyer Intercepting a Soviet Ship Carrying Missiles to Cuba."

[Color Photograph] October 1962. *Time Life Pictures/Getty Images*. I used this picture in my Appendix to show the blockade of Cuba.

"Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy." [Photograph] 1961. The National Park Service. This is a picture of John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev during their Vienna summit. This picture was included in my Appendix.

"Political Cartoon." 1962. Google Images. This is a fun cartoon showing the struggle between Kennedy and Khrushchev. I used this cartoon in my Appendix, notice that Khrushchev is sweating more than Kennedy.

Prats, Armando R. and Gloria Prats Childers. Telephone Interview. February 1, 2008.

These two are Cuban Immigrants to the United States that lived in Cuba when Castro came to power. They were an interesting interview that gave me a unique insight to life under Castro.

"Russian Advisors in Cuba." [Photograph] 1961 – 1962. The National Security Archive.

This is a picture of Russian Advisors in Cuba. I used this rare picture in my Appendix.

"Russian Ship Poltova." [Photograph] October 1962. The National Security Archive. This is a picture of a Russian ship bringing missiles back to the Soviet Union after the Crisis.

This picture was put in my Appendix.

"U-2 Photograph of Missile Sites in Cuba." [Photograph] October 15, 1962. The National Security Archive. This is one of the pictures shown to President Kennedy proving there were missiles in Cuba. I used this picture in my appendix.

"U-2 Spy Plane." [Photograph] 1960 – 1962. The National Security Archive. It was this

type of plane that first discovered the missiles in Cuba. I used this picture in my appendix. This is a picture of an American U-2 Plane.

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"John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum: JFK in History, The Cuban Missile Crisis." [Online] Available <<http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/JFK+in+History/Cuban+Missile+Crisis.htm>>, January 20, 2008. This site provided interesting background information on John Kennedy and his role in the Crisis.

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This book was a great personal insight from Robert Kennedy about what happened in October 1962. I didn't use much factual information because history has proven some of the details were misrepresented, such as the secret deal between Khrushchev and Kennedy.

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Munton, Don and David A. Welch. *The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. This book was a great help by putting it more on my level. It also was a basic overview of the crisis.

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[~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/index.htm](http://nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/index.htm)>, January 25, 2008. This was an extremely valuable source that provided many documents, photographs and articles.

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Appendix

No. 1



Nikita Khrushchev and John F Kennedy in Vienna 1961.
Courtesy of The National Park Service.

No 2.



Fidel Castro hugs Nikita Khrushchev sealing their friendship.
Courtesy The Associated Press

No 3.



Soviet advisors in Cuba 1962. Courtesy
The National Security Archive.

No 4.



One of the U2 photographs shot by Major Richard Kaiser. These photos were shown to President Kennedy as proof that the Soviets were installing missiles in Cuba. Courtesy of The National Security Archive.

No. 5



An ExComm meeting held in the White House, 1962. Courtesy of The National Security Archive.

No. 6




U.S. Navy destroyer intercepting a Soviet ship carrying missiles to Cuba. October 1962. Courtesy of Carl Mydans -Time Life Pictures/Getty Images.

No. 7




October 24, 1962. The Poltava heads for home with its missile cargo exposed so US planes could verify the missile removal. Courtesy of The National Security Archive.

No. 8




A political cartoon that appeared in major US newspapers. Courtesy Google Images.

No. 9



An American U-2 plane like the one that was shot down over Cuba almost setting off the war. Courtesy of The National Security Archive.

No. 10




A US Jupiter based in Turkey. These obsolete missiles were part of the secret deal with Khrushchev. Courtesy of Google Images.

No. 11



A Soviet SS-4 Medium Range Nuclear like the ones based in Cuba.
Courtesy of The National Security Archive.

No. 12



US school children practice a duck and cover drill during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Courtesy The Associated Press.

No. 13



President John F Kennedy and his brother Robert.
Courtesy of The University of California, Los Angeles.
Library. Department of Special Collections.